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It's no surprise that the world's youngest economy - the global economy - is still finding 
its bearings. The intricate checks and balances that stabilize economies are only 
incorporated with time. Many world markets are only recently freed, governed for the 
first time by the emotions of the people rather than the fists of the state. From where we 
sit, none of this diminishes the promise offered a decade ago by the demise of the walled 
off world. The spread of free markets and democracy around the world is permitting 
more people everywhere to turn their aspirations into achievements. And technology, 
properly harnessed and liberally distributed, has the power to erase not just geographical 
borders but also human ones. It seems to us that, for a 10-year-old, the world continues to 
hold great promise. In the meantime, no one ever said growing up was easy (13). 
-Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree  
 
 The decades following the end of the Cold War have been marked by globalization, 
including an incredible amount of economic integration. The “walled off world,” a 
characterization that conjures images of the Berlin Wall, has given way to a connected world. 
States formerly separated by political and technological realities are now linked together with 
humming highways of trade. Hammer blows against the cement barriers that divided Berlin are 
still reverberating around the world in the form of roads, tunnels, bridges, airports, highways, 
and ports, working to crumble the remaining walls of the previous century. The process of 
globalization has manifested itself rapidly since the 1990s with the spread of free markets and 
the creation of institutions that allow for the transcendence of borders by goods, and sometimes 
even people. As the world’s youngest economy, the global economy can be anthropomorphized 
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as a young and impressionable person in the throes of a rapid growth spurt. Like many people 
during this time of their lives, the global economy does hold great promise but also experiences 
growing pains, clumsiness, naivety, and has even acquired a few bad habits and parasites along 
the way. In a world full of opportunity and blinding mobility, there are actors that would seek to 
exploit the natural clumsiness and naivety that characterize anything undergoing rapid growth. 
The continued success of these actors demonstrates that the global economy and the states that 
benefit from it still have a lot of growing up to do. 
Criminal organizations are amongst the most successful exploiters of the aforementioned 
characteristics of the global economy. They occupy the gaps and blind spots that have formed 
and grown since the 1990s, including the gap between rapid economic activity and limited state 
scrutiny. ‘Ndrangheta, a criminal organization based in the Southern Italian region of Calabria 
stages its most lucrative operations in commercial hubs where the state has an economic 
incentive to limit its scrutiny of the products entering its borders, and as a result enormous 
amounts of commercial traffic occurs without a second glance. There is also the gap between 
economic and legal integration. Globalization has included extensive amounts of economic 
integration between states in the form of free trade agreements and the development of 
commercial infrastructure. Meanwhile states have done little to integrate their legal systems, and 
‘Ndrangheta successfully navigates the forest of conflicting, asymmetrical, and outdated legal 
codes to hide or protect itself. In order to rid the global economy of some of its growing pains 
and parasitic hangers-on, states must embrace their prerogative to match economic activity with 
appropriate levels of scrutiny and integration. Otherwise ‘Ndrangheta and its counterparts will 
continue to grow more powerful, entrenched, wealthy, and inextricable from the global economy.  
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In this thesis, the ability of ‘Ndrangheta to exploit gaps between commerce, scrutiny, 
economic integration, and legal symmetry, will be demonstrated through two case studies. The 
first case study revolves around the Port of Gioia Tauro, which serves as the premier drug 
trafficking hub of ‘Ndrangheta and is emblematic of the global trends in commercial traffic and 
security deficits. The second case study focuses on an incident from 2011 in which Italian law 
enforcement called for the extradition of former Australian mayor Tony Vallelonga for his 
association with ‘Ndrangheta. The Australian government ultimately refused the extradition 
request, as extradition treaties require dual criminality and Tony Vallelonga, a citizen of 
Australia and Italy, had not broken an Australian law. This case demonstrates the severe gap 
between advanced economic integration and insufficient legal integration.   
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Port of Gioia Tauro Case Study: The consequences of economic integration 
 
 The Port of Gioia Tauro is located in the Southern Italian province of Calabria, where the 
toe of the Italian boot meets the Tyrrhenian Sea. The port was constructed during the 1970s to 
provide public sector jobs for the struggling communities around Reggio Calabria. Protests and 
violent upheaval around Reggio Calabria in 1970 demonstrated the depth of the desperation in 
Calabria. According to Paul Ginsborg’s A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 
“behind the protest lay a socio-economic situation of considerable gravity. Not more than five 
thousand people in the whole of Calabria were employed in large or stable workplaces. In 
Reggio twelve thousand people lived in squalid shacks, some of which dated back to 1908… The 
retail trade soaked up manpower, but with one shop for every thirty inhabitants there were 
frequent closures and no security of employment” (154). 
 The upheaval around Reggio Calabria in 1970 was extensive and forced the Italian 
government to heavily invest in the region’s economy. Ginsborg writes that “for the period of 
July-September 1970 alone, according to official figures, there were nineteen days of general 
strikes, twelve dynamite explosions, thirty-two road-blocks, fourteen occupations of the railway 
station; two of the post office, one of the airport and one of the local TV station; there were six 
assaults on the prefecture and four on the police headquarters (questura); 426 people were 
charged with public-order offences, three people were killed and more than 200 wounded” (156). 
The Port of Gioia Tauro was born amid the violence and desperation that had gripped the region. 
 Government investment into the region came with the construction of the “Fifth 
Steelwork Center” in Reggio Calabria, which included a large steel plant, a railroad terminal, and 
most importantly, the Port of Gioia Tauro. The projects had the intended effect of quelling the 
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local population with the promise of up to 10,000 jobs (CIS 13). While the port and 
accompanying steel projects were built during the subsequent years, they were never made 
operational. The Port of Gioia Tauro became another one of Southern Italy’s “cathedrals in the 
desert,” that is, a public works project that never came to fruition or achieved the level of utility 
that had been promised. The port sat, unused, until the 1990s. In 1994 an entrepreneur named 
Angelo Ravano proposed a complete remodel of the existing infrastructure into a commercial 
port (CIS 14).  If the Port of Gioia Tauro was born in the context of violence and desperation 
during the 1970s, it would be reborn during the rapid globalization and optimism of the 1990s. 
 In 2012 the Centre for Industrial Studies in Milan created a detailed assessment of the 
transformation of the Port of Gioia Tauro and its subsequent growth for the European 
Commission, which had partnered with Angelo Ravano to finance the project during the 1990s. 
The European Commission, which serves as the executive body of the European Union, financed 
about 14% of the project’s cost through the European Regional Development Fund and the 
European Social Fund (CIS 3). While the port was originally constructed as an entirely public 
project, its transformation into a commercial port was overwhelmingly a private enterprise. 
According to the CIS assessment, private investment covered 85% of the project’s cost, making 
the project an economic symbol of the period of privatization, deregulation, and economic 
integration that characterized the post-Cold War order. Most strikingly, less than 1% of the port’s 
cost was covered by national, regional, and local contributions, a significant departure from the 
public financing model for the building of infrastructure that had served as the norm in Italy and 
throughout Europe during the post-Second World War period. (CIS 3) 
 The CIS assessment describes the project as “an emblematic story of great business 
success and unexploited potential for local development” (2). This declaration at the beginning 
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of the assessment carefully defines the project as a “business success.” Operationally, the port 
continues to serve as the standard bearer for the transshipment model and provides a crucial trade 
link between the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal that can host the largest container ships. 
The effects of globalization lowered the costs of commercial transport with the rise of large 
container carrying vessels, meanwhile the demand for deep ports that could host these ships rose 
amid a boom in freight transportation between the Mediterranean Sea and Far East. The Gioia 
Tauro Port Authority also notes the port is “located in the heart of the Mediterranean, a meeting 
point between the East-West sea lanes and the trans-European corridor” and occupies “a central 
position with respect to the corridors of the intercontinental routes that run through the 
Mediterranean basin” (“Mission & Values”). The port’s design, location, and constructing timing 
allowed it to become “the premier transshipment hub in the Mediterranean” (“Mission & 
Values”). The CIS assessment defines transshipment as “a scheme of transport, consisting of 
disembarking cargo from a large ship (or mother vessel) in an intermediate destination port and 
then embarking it onto smaller ships (feeder vessels) for onward transport to its final destination” 
(19). The assessment adds that transshipment ports were in demand because “transshipment 
activity boomed during the 1990s as a result of the increase in international trade following 
globalization dynamics, freight containerization and the need to cut global freight transport 
costs” (10). For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that “in most cases, the goods 
in the containers are not cleared through customs in the transshipment hub, but rather in their 
destination ports” meaning the millions of containers that temporarily sit in the Port of Gioia 
Tauro every year are usually not required to clear customs inspections (CIS 10). 
In terms of return on investment, the port is not exactly a testament to the efficacy of the 
business model employed by the European Union and private investors. The CIS assessment 
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found that “up to now the project has proven to be not financially sustainable, as its cumulated 
net cash flows have not been positive each year since the start of the operational phase (1995)” 
(4). The assessment attributes this failure to its “socio-economic context and dependency on 
highly volatile global demand” (4). Essentially the solvency of the port depends on a consistently 
high level of traffic, and economic fluctuations stemming from events like the global recession in 
2008 prevented this consistency. Additionally, the port did not bring the widespread 
development to the region that was originally expected during its transformation and its local 
benefits were instead limited to increasing employment. According to the assessment, Calabria 
was the least developed region in Italy when the port was transformed in the 1990s and retains 
this title today. The Province of Reggio Calabria has not experienced a significant economic 
boost since 1995, despite containing Italy’s most active port. The following chart illustrates 
Reggio Calabria’s per capita GDP relative to that of the region of Calabria and Southern Italy at 
large, between 1995 and 2008. Note the pronounced fluctuations in GDP plus the magnified 
effect of the 2008 recession on Reggio Calabria as the volatility of the port’s traffic levels jerked 




 Much of the local frustration surrounding the port stems from this inability to pass its 
operational success onto the local population, coupled with the surge in criminal activity relating 
to port’s traffic (CIS 9). Ultimately the GDP of Reggio Calabria was lower in 2008 than it had 
been before the construction of the port, after a ten-year decline. The port’s “business success,” 
having had little benefit to the local population, continues to enrich the region’s ‘Ndrangheta 
clans beyond their wildest expectations. The ability of ‘Ndrangheta to exploit the port depends 
on its design, policies, and location. It is important to detail the scale of the port’s operations and 
the precautions taken by the state to demonstrate how the Port of Gioia Tauro and similar 
commercial hubs continue to challenge states’ abilities to scrutinize the expanding rivers of 
goods flowing through their borders. As diplomacy and technology continue to provide an 
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impetus for states to integrate their economies and increase the amount of commerce flowing 
through their points of exit and entry, it is crucial that they take appropriate measures to ensure 
criminal actors do not exploit flows of licit goods for the purpose of moving their illicit goods.  
The Port of Gioia Tauro maintains its title as the largest port in Italy in terms of container 
throughput, that is, the number of containers handled per year. With the rise of container-based 
trade and transshipment ports, throughput has become the standard measure for the productivity 
of a seaport. According to the CIS assessment, Gioia Tauro’s operational success can be 
attributed in part to its natural depth, 18 meters at its deepest (20). The port offers a long, deep 
section of water 3.4 kilometers long that can service up to four “ultra large container carriers,” 
more than any other European port. The port is also equipped with 22 ship-to-shore cranes that 
can service 23 rows of containers. Its throughput peaked on the eve of the global financial crisis 
in 2008, reaching 3,467,772 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) that year (CIS 20). This peak 
traffic level implies the processing of about 9500 containers per day. One TEU typically 
represents one shipping container and the measurement is used to quantify the carrying capacity 
of a vessel or the throughput of a port.  
For comparison, the Port of Naples, to which the very first chapter of Roberto Saviano’s 
Gomorra is dedicated, processes up to 500,000 TEUs annually. This number is a mere 14% of 
Gioia Tauro’s capacity (Harbours Review)1. The same conditions, economic forces, and 
consequences vividly described by Saviano in his first chapter titled “The Port” are still at play in 
Gioia Tauro, but on an even larger scale. The exasperation of Naples’ Port Authority and local 
law enforcement is magnified for their Calabrian counterparts.  
The following table provided by the CIS assessment illustrates the emergence of 
commercial container shipping, in terms of world container throughput. The Port of Gioia Tauro 
1Roberto Saviano’s Gomorra is an acclaimed non-fiction investigative book published in 2006. It exposed the criminal underworld 
of Neapolitan strain of organized crime collectively known as the Camorra. The book examined in incredible detail the operations 
of the Camorra and how it has developed, expanded, and transformed to exploit economic trends from urbanization in Southern 
Italy to the modern phenomenon of globalization. 
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emerged at the ideal moment during the 1990s when container-based shipping exploded and 





A port, of course, is not just a set of docks. The Port of Gioia Tauro has a total area of 
4,400,000 square meters, or 822 football fields (CIS 10). The land components of the port, about 
75% of its total area, include expansive zones for container handling and storage and a privately 
owned terminal (CIS 10). A vacant industrial area adjoins the port property and adds another 3.6 
million square meters to the grounds. The Port Authority of Gioia Tauro and its affiliate security 
wing are responsible for preventing illegal activity throughout this entire area. The following 






The square strips of color above the channel (highlighted in red) are container loading 
and temporary storage areas, officially called the Medcenter Container Terminal. Above the 
large container terminal are vacant industrial areas. The administrative center containing the 
offices of the Harbormaster, Port Authority, and Port Security are located in Zone 1. 
The Port Authority of Gioia Tauro administers the port and oversees an entity titled Gioia 
Tauro Port Security, the port’s security apparatus. Despite the frequent use of the port for illicit 
activity by ‘Ndrangheta clans, the Gioia Tauro Port Security (GTPS) maintains that its sole 
objective is to “guarantee a high safety standard for economic operators; therefore, the port 
security legislation called International Ship and Port Facility Security Code has been 
implemented, which contains provisions aimed at preventing terrorist attacks to the detriment of 
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the ship or port infrastructure” (“Security Portuale”). It is reasonable to expect the port’s security 
system to take protective measures against possible terrorism, but the exclusion of anti-mafia 
language in its mission statement is a telling preview of its demonstrated inability to confront the 
actual illicit activity at the port. The Port of Gioia Tauro is unlikely to experience any form of 
terrorist attack that would jeopardize the safety of “economic operators,” but the port’s recent 
history does indicate a high degree of vulnerability to less overt but far more lucrative forms of 
crime.  
The tunnel vision focus on terrorism on the part of GTPS might not stem from simply 
willful ignorance of other more imminent threats. Gioia Tauro Port Security does not have many 
inspective obligations because, as noted previously, the Port of Gioia Tauro is a transshipment 
port and most containers are only temporarily unloaded before being redistributed onto smaller 
vessels. These containers are not required to clear customs because their contents will not 
officially enter the country until they are unloaded at their next destination. With regard to the 
freight temporarily housed in the port, the responsibilities of GTPS are restricted to “control of 
documentation for the purpose of access to authorized port; monitoring of common areas and 
port facilities through surveys; carrying out periodic patrols in the port area for the monitoring of 
the plants; specific security operations” (“Security Portuale”). The contents of the port’s freight 
are not within the jurisdiction of GTPS and it can only attempt to prevent its illegal loading or 
unloading. GTPS also has limitations in terms of manpower, technology, and intelligence 
resources. While the Port Authority of Gioia Tauro is a government entity, GTPS is a private 
subsidiary of the Port Authority and not part of a larger law enforcement or military body. 
Further information on GTPS is difficult to come by, -all but its website home page are listed as 
“under construction”-. The largest port in Italy in terms of container traffic, processing over 9500 
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container units per day, effectively outsources its security to a small private security company 
that cannot maintain a functional website, and about 25 police officers (Mucci).  
The Port of Gioia Tauro’s performance as a transshipment port has varied since it became 
operational in 1995. Port traffic rapidly increased during its first five years of operations and by 
2000 the port hosted 35% of Mediterranean commercial traffic, easily the largest market share in 
the region (CIS 23). Despite this rapid increase in traffic, the Italian government did little to 
update the port, eroding the quality of the port’s service and contributing to its gradual loss of 
competitiveness with its North African and Spanish counterparts. While efficiency and 
productivity suffered without continued updates, an ominous gap also appeared between the 
port’s security capacity and a high level of traffic that still outpaced its European counterparts. 
The scope and capabilities of GTPS have remained static since the security apparatus was 
established. It is not surprising that this gap between high levels of port traffic and overstretched 
or insufficient law enforcement continues to be exploited by criminal actors, and not only in the 
Port of Gioia Tauro. An anonymous manager of the Medcenter Terminal, in a 2015 interview 
with Al Jazeera, effectively articulated the frustrating relationship between traffic and scrutiny at 
the port: “How can we check everything? If we checked every cargo, no ship would stop and the 
port would die” (Mucci). 
It is also unlikely that Italian imports will relent in the future, particularly the types of 
imports most likely to be exploited by ‘Ndrangheta. The European Union is currently negotiating 
trade agreements with Canada and several South American states to further expand commercial 
links between Europe and these regions, including two that already host significant levels of 
‘Ndrangheta activity: Argentina and Canada (CEU Trade Policy). 
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In the opening chapter of Gomorra, Roberto Saviano describes a parallel situation to that 
of Gioia Tauro at the Port of Naples, located just north of Calabria in the Italian region of 
Campania. Saviano creates a vivid and ominous rendering of the daily chaos that takes place at 
Italian ports, as well as the benefits afforded to organized crime by this chaos. He writes that the 
Port of Naples is “an open wound. The end point for the interminable voyage that merchandise 
makes. Ships enter the gulf and come to the dock like babies to the breast, except that they’re 
here to be milked, not fed” (4). He continues: 
 
In the silence of the port’s black hole, the molecular structure of merchandise seems to 
break down, only to recompose once it gets beyond the perimeter of the coast. Goods 
have to leave the port immediately. Everything happens so quickly that they disappear in 
the process, evaporate as if they’d never existed. As if nothing had happened, as if it had 
all been simply an act. An imaginary voyage, a false landing, a phantom ship, evanescent 
cargo. Goods need to arrive in the buyer’s hands without leaving any drool to mark their 
route, they have to reach their warehouse quickly, right away, before time can even 
begin— time that might allow for an inspection. Tons of merchandise move as if they 
were a package hand-delivered by the mailman. In the port of Naples— 330 acres spread 
out along seven miles of coastline— time expands and contracts. Things that take an hour 
elsewhere seem to happen here in less than a minute. Here the proverbial slowness that 
makes the Neapolitan’s every move molasses-like is quashed, confuted, negated (5). 
 
 At multiple points Saviano highlights the speed at which products must move through the 
Port of Naples. These products move “before time can even begin- time that might allow for an 
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inspection” (Saviano 5). The massive quantity of products moving through ports like Gioia 
Tauro and Naples demands quick processing, with little room for the inefficient delays that 
meticulous inspection would imply. These ports are an open wound for Italy in the sense that a 
wound places the body at risk to parasites that would like to exploit the new and vulnerable 
opening in the skin. The capacity for products to “disappear in the process” or “arrive in the 
buyer’s hands without leaving any drool to mark their route” is an undeniably attractive 
characteristic for those parasitic organizations seeking to insert their illicit products into the 
general influx. The actual Italian word for “drool” used by Saviano in this passage is bava, which 
invokes the trail of slime left by snails. The subtle snail metaphor is perfect in the sense that it 
captures the general nature of the commercial shipping boom of the 1990s and onward. In fact, 
both Italian exports and imports increased by about 110% between 1995 and 2016, providing a 
massive stream of commerce upon which organizations like ‘Ndrangheta could piggyback their 
illicit shipments (World Bank).  
The movement of products during the previous decades could be seen as snail-like when 
compared to the accelerated 21st century model. During the 1990s, relatively slow and traceable 
movement quickly gave way to something much faster and far more difficult to scrutinize. 
Saviano reinforces this point with another parallel animal metaphor: “A port is measured by its 
speed, and every bureaucratic sluggishness, every meticulous inspection, transforms the cheetah 
of transport into a slow and lumbering sloth” (6). The economic incentives to move products 
more quickly through the port do in fact take precedence over security. Saviano cites statistics 
provided by the Italian Customs Agency, which found that “60 percent of the goods arriving in 
Naples escape official customs inspection” (7). Being that Naples is not a transshipment port, 
this number is particularly shocking. As previously explained, Gioia Tauro is uniquely 
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vulnerable when it comes to Italian ports because it is not a final destination goods passing 
through it are rarely subject to inspection. At the Port of Naples, where most containers are 
actually unloaded, there is a justifiably larger customs presence. While this heightened customs 
presence still yields a 60% escape rate in Naples, Gioia Tauro’s higher level of traffic and lower 
customs presence due to its transshipment designation explain why this port in particular has 
become the primary entry point for drugs entering Italy. 
 According to Saviano, products have “multiple, hybrid, and illegitimate citizenship. Half-
born in the middle of China, they’re finished on the outskirts of some Slavic city, refined in 
northeastern Italy, packaged in Puglia or north of Tirana in Albania, and finally end up in a 
warehouse somewhere in Europe. No human being could ever have the rights of mobility that 
merchandise has” (6). When one understands the true permeability of world borders to goods by 
way of truck or ship, the true vulnerability of ports like Gioia Tauro and Naples becomes much 
clearer. However, ‘Ndrangheta also exploits the institutions that provide for the free movement 
of people, in addition to those that prohibit it. The high demand for passage into Europe from the 
Middle East due to regional conflict and asylum opportunities in Germany have induced some 
‘Ndrangheta clans to engage in human trafficking. Meanwhile institutions such as the Schengen 
Area in the EU and further visa agreements for Italian citizens allow clan members to travel 
between Calabria and foreign bases of operation around the world without a visa and sometimes 
without the need to clear customs. While ‘Ndrangheta exploits policies that provide for the free 
movement of both individuals and products, the mixed origins of products and their 
extraordinary freedom of movement through the ports of the world gives them a particularly 
potent form of anonymity. 
 17 
The more creative and often horrific methods of drug trafficking have an outsized weight 
when it comes to the general public’s perception of the dominant drug trafficking methods. 
Many have heard the stories involving catapults sending bricks of cocaine over the U.S.-Mexico 
border or perhaps drug runners using tunnels underneath it, or even the morbid emergence of the 
“heroin mule,” that is, a Latin American woman trained to swallow and later expel balloons of 
heroin in order to move the product into the United States via airport. The public has also been 
exposed to images of the remarkable “cigarette boats” and aircraft used by the Colombian drug 
cartels to spirit cocaine through the Caribbean into Florida. Further misconceptions about drug 
trafficking may also be perpetuated to serve some form of political goal, such as the reduction of 
immigration flows. A frequent and demonstrably erroneous argument for the creation of stronger 
borders between states is that undocumented immigrants will carry drugs with them over 
unfortified borders. But the reality of global drug trafficking is far more complex and cannot be 
remedied with border fortification or frisking individuals at airports. The vast majority of drug 
traffic that enters Europe and the United States from South America does so through the same 
means and entry points as licit commercial traffic. Licit goods do not typically penetrate borders 
by way of tunnel, catapult, or attached to the human body, and neither do drugs.  
In its glowing report on the Port of Gioia Tauro’s performance, the CIS assessment 
grudgingly acknowledges “The Role of Organized Crime” in a small aside halfway through the 
document (28). This acknowledgment, while brief, does preview the parasitic relationship 
between the port and ‘Ndrangheta, particularly when it comes to interactions between the owners 
of the Medcenter Terminal (MCT) and the local Piromalli-Molè clan. This relationship began as 
one that very much resembled the traditional protection rackets employed by organized crime in 
Italy. As the Italian government attempted to rebuild Italy’s infrastructure and economy in the 
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decades after World War Two, Italian organized crime jumped at the chance to make a profit. 
John Dickey explains the rise of the “cement mafia” in his book, Cosa Nostra: A History of the 
Sicilian Mafia: 
 
The sack of Palermo began on the ground, with the mafiosi who now kept watch over the 
building sites just as they had once kept watch over the lemon groves. Vandalism and 
theft could bring any construction project to a halt if the local boss chose. The second 
story of mafia influence was a dense tier of small subcontractors who supplied workers 
and materials…  On the level above them were the great building entrepreneurs, men tied 
into corrupt webs of friends, relatives, clients, and cohorts. Those networks become 
thicker and thicker the more one probes, connecting local politicians, municipal 
functionaries, lawyers, policemen, building contractors, bankers, businessmen, and 
mafiosi (225).  
 
This phenomenon is notorious for having corrupted public works projects in Sicily, but it 
also occurred in Calabria. The local clan would offer construction companies assistance in 
procuring lucrative government building contracts. The same clan usually controlled a pocket of 
votes that it could offer, along with bribes, to politicians in exchange for these contracts. The 
clan would then extract a share of the government contract for its services rendered, and finally 
turn around and demand that the construction company pay a protection fee to the clan so that it 
could provide men to watch over the construction sites, or it would subject them to vandalism. 
This “protection racket” was the modus operandi of Italian organized crime during much of the 
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postwar reconstruction era, and eventually made its way into the transformation of the Port of 
Gioia Tauro in the 1990s.  
According to the CIS assessment, which cites a 2008 report of the Italian Parliamentary 
Investigative Commission on Organized Crime, Mafia, and Similar Organizations, “the Piromalli 
family, the most influential in the Gioia Tauro area, asked MCT (Medcenter Terminal) to pay a 
kickback of US$1.50 for each transshipped container as a sort of ‘security tax’” (28). The report 
alleges that an agreement was actually reached between Angelo Ravano, the entrepreneur that 
helped transform the port, and the Piromalli family, however, the CIS assessment asserts, “no 
judiciary evidence exists pointing to the alleged agreements between MCT and organized crime” 
(28). Meanwhile the actual 2008 report produced by the commission argues: 
 
The subordination of Contship Italia and of its founder Angelo Ravano to the ’ndrangheta 
has already been clear since the initial phase of the project, because Ravano wanted to 
realize his business project without obstacles and interference. Thus, he showed that he 
was considering the mafia organization not as an enemy of free economic initiative, that 
must be stopped and denounced, but as a reliable actor necessary to protect and ensure 
the implementation of his business project. The process about the issue, which ended in 
2000, showed that the realization of the most important political/industrial investment 
ever conceived for the South of Italy had been preceded by a preliminary agreement 
between Contship and the mafia families of the Piromalli and the Molè from Gioia Tauro 
and Bellocco – Pesce di Rosarno, that were, but still are, dominant in the area around 
Gioia Tauro and were associated in a cartel led by the boss Piromalli.  
(Camera dei Deputati 151) 
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It is not clear whether ‘Ndrangheta actually did enter into this agreement with Angelo 
Ravano, but the format of the arrangement certainly mirrors the standard practice of organized 
crime in Italy leading up to 1995. Regardless, the CIS assessment characterizes this incident as 
“parallel with the construction of Gioia Tauro,” in that it was limited to the port’s actual 
construction and was merely a preview of the ‘Ndrangheta activity that followed (28).  
The assessment then admits, “it is likely that organized crime enjoyed a bonanza as a 
result of the port operations” and cites the 2008 Commission report, which concluded, “the 
‘ndrangheta uses the facility as a base for illegal trafficking” (28). In this way, the exploitation of 
the port’s repurposing for transshipment between 1994 and 1995 invoked the older business 
model employed by organized crime in Italy, dependent on government contracts, protection 
rackets, and territorial control of Italian towns and voting blocks. However, once the port became 
operational in 1995, it began to host a newer, globalized model of organized crime, dependent on 
drug trafficking and decentralized ‘Ndrangheta clans scattered throughout the world. The Port of 
Gioia Tauro emerged during the last gasps of the “cement mafia” that exploited heavy 
government infrastructure investment, but the port gained true operational value for ‘Ndrangheta 
as a drug trafficking hub that exploits an increasingly integrated world economy. The trickle of 
drugs that initially moved through the port in the 1990s had turned into a deafening roar and the 
lifeblood of ‘Ndrangheta by 2008. In 2013, the organization became the recipient of international 
attention when Italian law enforcement announced ‘Ndrangheta was producing an annual 
revenue of over $60 billion, predominantly from its drug trafficking success in Gioia Tauro 
(Mucci). Headlines such as “’Ndrangheta mafia made more last year than McDonalds Deutsche 
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Bank” appeared in newspapers around the world while many had never even heard of the 
organization before (Mucci).  
The capacity for organized crime to transform and adapt to exploit new economic 
opportunities is also discussed in Gomorra. The Neapolitan counterpart of ‘Ndrangheta, the 
Camorra, demonstrates many of the same tendencies. Saviano writes: 
 
Investigations conducted by the Naples anti-Mafia prosecutor reveal that the Camorra’s 
flexible, federalist structure has completely transformed the fabric of the families: instead 
of diplomatic alliances and stable pacts, clans now operate more like business 
committees. The Camorra’s flexibility reflects its need to move capital, set up and 
liquidate companies, circulate money, and invest quickly in real estate without 
geographical restrictions or heavy dependence on political mediation (45). 
 
 John Dickey makes a similar point about the adaptability of the mafia in Cosa Nostra: 
 
Over the past century and a half the mafia has responded to all of the great challenges of 
modernity: to capitalism, to the emergence of the nation-state, to democracy, to the rise 
and fall of the great ideologies of Socialism and Fascism, to global war, to 
industrialization and deindustrialization. Nothing that the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries could throw at the Sicilian mafia managed to stop it (329).   
 
As demonstrated in Gioia Tauro during the 1990s, ‘Ndrangheta possesses the same 
capacity for adaptation and transformation as its Sicilian and Neapolitan counterparts. When the 
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port represented a significant opportunity to glean lucrative building contracts and protection 
fees, it responded appropriately. When the port quickly became the busiest in Europe, 
‘Ndrangheta responded again with an even more lucrative business model that is not limited by 
the expiration dates of building contracts or willingness of corporate executives to pay protection 
fees. Nor does this new model confine ‘Ndrangheta clans to Italy where they could be broken up 
by the country’s relatively aggressive anti-mafia institutions. 
Extensive anti-mafia judicial action in 2008 severely limited the capacity of the 
Piromalli-Molè clan to continue its traditional activities of extorting MCT officials, exploiting 
lucrative government contracts, and infiltrating port personnel on a large scale. Several important 
members of the clan were actually prosecuted during a series of trials now called the “Cent’Anni 
di storia” trials (CIS 29). The trials revealed the extent to which the clan was profiting off of 
development of the port and its daily operations. 35% of the companies that received public 
grants for development of the port had some form of association with a local ‘Ndrangheta clan 
while another 20% of the companies maintained a direct association (CIS 29). In her book Mafia 
Brotherhoods, Letizia Paoli points out that Contship Italia and Medcenter, the owners of the 
Medcenter Terminal, “inserted firms indicated by the defendants in port-servicing activities and 
have hired people recommended by the mafia sodality” (218). Contship and Medcenter were not 
the subjects of any legal action and maintained that they were solely victims of ‘Ndrangheta who 
cooperated completely with law enforcement throughout the entire process. Meanwhile, the 
leadership of the clan was decimated. Girolamo, Peppe, and Gioacchino Piromalli were quickly 
convicted and incarcerated, while Rocco Molè was killed near Gioia Tauro that same year. This 
legal action compelled the ‘Ndrangheta clans that depended on the Port of Gioia Tauro, 
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including the Piromalli-Molè clan, to complete the transition from protection rackets and 
construction contracts to a more absolute dependence on drug trafficking (Gratteri 153). 
It is difficult to determine the amount of drugs that enter Europe through Gioia Tauro, in 
addition to its share of the overall drug imports for the continent and criminal profits from these 
operations. Measuring these phenomenon runs into the classic problem of trying to quantify 
clandestine market exchanges. However, weighing evidence such as increases in overall 
quantities seized in Gioia Tauro and extensive ‘Ndrangheta ties to South American cocaine 
production, Italian authorities are able to make some estimates. There is also a general rule used 
by law enforcement when quantifying the total amount of drug traffic. Italian law enforcement 
maintains that there are about nine kilograms of undetected cocaine moving through Gioia Tauro 
for every kilogram seized (Mucci). 
The CIS assessment found that, “most of the cocaine coming from Colombia reaches 
Europe through Gioia Tauro. The illegal trafficking is confirmed by the huge amounts of drugs 
confiscated in the port during various law enforcement operations…” (29). In his book, Cocaine 
Trafficking in the Caribbean and West Africa in the Era of the Mexican Cartels, Daurius Figueira 
identifies a news report from November of 2010 titled “10 tons of cocaine seized at Italian port” 
(62). The article is referring to an incident in which Gioia Tauro Port Security discovered 10 
metric tons of cocaine inside a shipping container originating in Brazil. Italian authorities 
announced that the seizure was the largest in Italy in 15 years, and designated the Port of Gioia 
Tauro as “part of a new ‘Ndrangheta pipeline for cocaine to enter Europe as this port is in the 
heart of ‘Ndrangheta’s domain” (62). Figueira continues:  
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According to Italian authorities the size of the haul indicates that ‘Ndrangheta is now 
moving cocaine into Europe via Italian entry points for distribution to the rest of Europe. 
A new hub is now being opened up in Italy to reduce the vulnerability of cocaine 
shipments focused to enter the North West and South West hubs. This new pipeline is an 
indication of the working relationship that exists between the ‘Ndrangheta, the cocaine 
producers and the DTOs of the Caribbean Basin (63). 
  
 Following the breakup of the Piromalli-Molè racket in 2008, ‘Ndrangheta has 
successfully cultivated relationships with each of the major Mexican Cartels: Los Zetas, Sinaloa, 
and Gulf, in addition to cocaine producing cartels in Colombia (the Mexican cartels maintain 
their own separate cocaine producing operations in Peru). The Reggio Calabria Prosecutors 
Office announced in July of 2011 that ‘Ndrangheta maintains a “hegemony” over the cocaine 
market in Europe because of its arrangements with South American cocaine producers (Figueira 
64). A separate operation was discovered in 2008, revealing another alliance between certain 
‘Ndrangheta clans and the Gulf Cartel. In June of 2012, six tons of cocaine were seized in 
Northern Italy, revealing further ‘Ndrangheta ties to South American cocaine production. Italian 
authorities discovered that the international trafficking operation, while headquartered in the 
region of Piedmont, “involved moving cocaine to Europe from Argentina, Venezuela, and the 
Dominican Republic,” indicating ‘Ndrangheta business ties to South America are even more 
extensive than previously thought (Figueira 64). Business Insider recently reported on the 
discovery a massive ‘Ndrangheta trafficking ring by Italian authorities in January of 2017. In this 
case, 54 people were arrested for having conspired to traffic $1.7 billion worth of cocaine into 
Europe. According to the report, “the group was allegedly conspiring to import about eight 
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metric tons, or 17,637 pounds, of cocaine from Colombia into Europe via seaports and airports in 
Calabria…” (Woody). The product itself was discovered at a cocaine plantation in Colombia and 
marked for transport to Italy. This discovery is a recent addition to a series of drug seizures 
involving the continued use of Gioia Tauro by ‘Ndrangheta, confirming its suspected dominance 
over Europe’s total cocaine supply. 
Figueira explains, “the lesson of this news report is that the ‘Ndrangheta have now 
created their own DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) moving product to Europe via multiple 
jump off points from Central to South America and the Caribbean. The Caribbean Basin is then 
today the pond of ‘Ndrangheta and its alliance partners: the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas” (65). 
The following map indicates the general maritime supply route used by ‘Ndrangheta and its 
business partners in the Colombian, Zetas, Sinaloa, and Gulf cartels, linking their cocaine bases 





 Following the transformation of the Port of Gioia Tauro and overall increases in 
commercial activity in Italy’s ports during the 1990s, cocaine seizures steadily rose from around 
100 kilograms annually during the 1980s to over 4000 kilograms annually since 2008. Between 
1985 and 2015 annual seizure levels actually increased by over 3800%. 
 
 
(European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction) 
 
Italian authorities have seized about 4 metric tons (4000 kilograms) of cocaine per year 
since 2008, according to a report published by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Addiction, an agency of the European Union. The report also found that, “the maritime route of 
illicit drug trafficking is of primary importance for all substances…” (EMCDA), indicating 
cocaine primarily arrives by ship. The Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA), an Italian law 
enforcement agency that deals with organized crime, found that 5 metric tons of cocaine was 
















about 31% of the total amount of cocaine seized in Italy during this period was seized at the Port 
of Gioia Tauro itself, while much of the remainder is believed to have come by way of the port. 
Given the “nine for every one” rule for drug confiscations, the DIA estimates that a total of 50 
metric tons moved through the port between 2011 and 2014 (Mucci). In an interview with Al 
Jazeera, an Italian magistrate specializing in organized crime named Roberto Di Palma 
remarked, “when it comes to drug trafficking, it is always hard to have reliable numbers. What 
we can say with certainty is that in terms of numbers of drug requisitions by port authorities, 
Gioia Tauro tops Europe” (Mucci). 
Between 2011 and 2014, about 80 metric tons of cocaine was seized in the European 
Union, with Italy’s own seizures contributing about 20% to this total, despite representing only 
8% of the EU’s population. Aside from Italy’s outsized impact on European cocaine seizure total 
reinforcing its status as a crucial landing point for the continent, note the difference between the 
estimated amount of cocaine moving through Gioia Tauro (50 metric tons) and the estimated 
amount consumed in the European Union (360 metric tons) between 2011 and 2014 (EMCDA). 
It is important to understand why these numbers still cause law enforcement officials in Italy and 
the European Union to estimate that as much 80% or more of the total amount of cocaine 
consumed in the EU arrives by way of Gioia Tauro, even though it would seem that its share of 
the total is much smaller. The answer can be found in the quality of the cocaine that arrives in 
Gioia Tauro, which is about 90% pure on average, a testament to the lucrative relationship 
between ‘Ndrangheta and its South American partners. This relationship allows the clans to 
import very pure cocaine directly from its producers and dominate the European market.  
According to Vincenzo Caruso, an official in the Guardia di Finanza (a law enforcement 
agency specializing in financial crime), "the cocaine arriving in Gioia Tauro is usually about 90 
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percent pure, meaning that it can be cut up to four times before being placed on the market" 
(Mucci). The process of “cutting” cocaine involves mixing filler material into the initial quantity 
to expand its mass, and therefore the amount that can eventually be sold. In this way, the original 
50 metric tons of 90% pure cocaine can quickly double, triple, and quadruple in mass as it is 
divided and cut by different dealers before final consumption. The estimated 50 metric tons that 
passed through Gioia Tauro between 2011 and 2014 was amplified until it reached a figure 





The capacity of highly pure cocaine to expand once it enters the European drug market 
confirms ‘Ndrangheta supremacy as a drug trafficking organization. Since the transformation of 
the Port of Gioia Tauro in 1995 and the overall surge in commercial shipping activity in the 
1990s, the organization has successfully positioned itself as the primary importer of cocaine on 
the continent, using Gioia Tauro as its landing point. To make the quantum leap from protection 
rackets, kidnappings, and construction projects to controlling 80% of the European cocaine 
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market and earning tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue, ‘Ndrangheta required an 
innovative and effective structural model, reminiscent of the “flexible, federalist structure” 




Tony Vallelonga Case Study: Globalization without legal symmetry  
 
Nicola Gratteri is an anti-mafia prosecutor based in Calabria and arguably the leading 
expert on ‘Ndrangheta in the world. His position as Procuratore della Repubblica di Catanzaro 
has afforded him extensive contact and experience with ‘Ndrangheta membership, and much of 
the information yielded from his study of ‘Ndrangheta on an organizational level is included in 
his book, Fratelli di sangue. In his discussion on the ‘Ndrangheta structural model, Gratteri 
begins with the locale (70). The locale serves as the basic organizational unit of ‘Ndrangheta, is 
composed of 49 affiliate members, and governed by a three-man executive committee called a 
terna (Gratteri 70). According to Gratteri the three executive positions that form a terna are the 
Capo Bastone, the Contabile, and the Capo Crimine. The Capo Bastone acts as the traditional 
familial head of the clan, who is ideally connected to numerous clan members by blood and 
marriage. The Contabile is the clan treasurer, responsible for handling licit and illicit earnings, 
distributing earnings to members, and engaging in practices like money laundering. The Capo 
Crimine is an expert on the particular criminal enterprise of the clan and would, for example, 
maintain contacts with Mexican drug cartels and port operators for the clan (Gratteri 70). Many 
of the hyphenated clan names refer to a locale in which two criminal families share jurisdiction. 
The previously mentioned Piromalli-Molè clan consists of two families operating together in a 
locale under combined leadership. Before both families were broken up by law enforcement, the 
Piromalli family served as the dominant partner and controlled the Capo Bastone and Contabile 
positions while the Molè family controlled the Capo Crimine position (Gratteri 154).  
Gratteri explains that a locale is a relatively simple institution that can be replicated 
outside of Italy (70). Locali have been documented in Australia, Canada, Argentina, Germany, 
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Holland, France, Spain, Switzerland, Colombia, and the United States. To a lesser extent, there is 
evidence of ‘Ndrangheta operations in Syria, Turkey, South Africa, Morocco, and Russia 
(Rinaldi). Without a hierarchical system like the Sicilian Cupola, ‘Ndrangheta clans are able to 
make independent business arrangements with one another and with outside organizations like 
the Mexican drug cartels or human trafficking groups in the Middle East and Africa.2 
‘Ndrangheta clans are also free to specialize in the type of criminal enterprise that suits their 
location in the world and adjust to changes in the market (Rinaldi). For example, the Nirta clan 
has formed a locale in South America specializing in trafficking cocaine to Gioia Tauro, in 
addition to partnering with the Strangio clan to form another locale in Germany for distribution. 
Meanwhile the Di Giovane clan uses its locale in Switzerland to import hashish. The Timboli, 
Sergi, and Barbaro clans operate several locali in Australia for the purposes of arms and heroin 
trafficking (Rinaldi). Some ‘Ndrangheta clans with heroin trafficking connections to the Middle 
East made the transition to human trafficking when the Syrian Civil War and subsequent asylum 
opportunities in Germany created a new demand for entry into Europe. This flexible network 
allows ‘Ndrangheta to move the supply to the demand, whether its human beings from Syria to 
Germany or cocaine from Colombia to Italy (Rinaldi). 
The establishment of this network of locali around the world is part of a criminal 
“colonization” process, made possible by previous waves of emigration out of Calabria. Since 
the emigration out of Calabria in the 1950s and 60s it has become very apparent to international 
law enforcement that ‘Ndrangheta clans can establish themselves far outside of their native 
communities through a form of colonization. According to the 2013 Italian Organized Crime 
Threat Assessment published by Europol:  
2 The Cupola or Commission is an institution created by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra to act as its governing body. The Cupola 
featured representatives of the different mafia territories and was used for the mediation of disputes, sanctioning 
disciplinary action, and the general regulation of mafia activities. Its existence was revealed to Italian law enforcement by 
Tommaso Buscetta, a former mafioso and informant, during maxi-trials of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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‘Colonisation’ is a term frequently used to illustrate the expansion of the ‘Ndrangheta 
outside its native region of Calabria. …Cosa Nostra and other Sicilian groups do not try 
to replicate their basic structures away from Sicily, but they tend to send emissaries. Not 
so with the ‘Ndrangheta, which implants perfect copies of its essential structures in 
territories not under its control, pursuing a long-term strategy of progressive infiltration 
in new economic and social environments… Consolidated and better integrated 
immigrant communities of Calabrians all over the world provided fertile ground for 
external offshoots of the criminal organisation (11). 
 
Since Italian unification during the 19th century, emigration out of Southern Italy and 
into states throughout Europe and the Americas has been commonplace. Much of this 
phenomenon was due to persistent economic underdevelopment in the region. As a result, 
Italians left Southern Italy in waves, the largest of which occurring between 1951 and 1965.  
During this period an estimated 4,661,000 individuals would leave Italy (“Italiani Emigrati”). 
This period also marks the largest exodus of Calabrians, which would make up a significant 
portion of those emigrating out of Italy. The most predominantly Calabrian waves of emigration 
out of Italy arrived primarily in Canada, Germany, Argentina, and Australia during this period, 
while Calabrian immigration to the United States peaked before the First World War and fell 
steadily for the rest of the 20th century. The immigrant communities in which ‘Ndrangheta 
operates today were established during this 14 year period between 1951 and 1965, and the 
organization still relies on them for recruiting local Calabrian membership. These communities 
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were “consolidated and better integrated,” and provide “fertile ground for external offshoots of 
the criminal organization” (Europol 11). New locale members in Canada, Australia, Germany, or 
Argentina are integrated into the host community, likely to hold Italian and local citizenship, and 
receptive toward ‘Ndrangheta structures such as its initiation ritual and practice of intra-clan 
marriage.  
Tony Vallelonga, born Domenicantonio Cosimo Vallelonga, left Calabria as a teenager in 
1963 amidst the wave of emigration from the region. He went on to have a successful career in 
Australia as a property developer and active member of the large Calabrian community in and 
around Perth, the capital of Western Australia. It is still unclear whether Vallelonga became an 
initiated member of ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria as a teenager or after immigrating to Australia 
(McKenzie). According to Nicola Gratteri, Perth and its suburbs in Western Australia falls under 
the locale of the Romeo clan (236). It is likely that Vallelonga worked as an affiliate of the Perth 
locale as his property development business grew and he began to enter local politics in Sterling, 
a suburb of Perth. He was elected to the Sterling City Council and served four terms as the city’s 
mayor from 1997 to 2005 (McKenzie). The extent to which Vallelonga facilitated ‘Ndrangheta 
activity in Australia during his time as an elected official has not yet been revealed by Italian 
investigators, but it is suspected that he may have manipulated waste disposal, building contracts, 
and law enforcement, potentially even using his licit businesses for money laundering and cover 
for the locale activity (McKenzie). Vallelonga retired from elected office in 2005 as a popular 
local leader, known for his involvement in a children’s charitable foundation and work in the 
development of Sterling. He was even named an Honorary Freeman of the City of Sterling for 
his service and continues to swear in city’s newly elected mayors (Pond). 
In 2009, Vallelonga visited his hometown of Siderno, Calabria. During the visit he held a 
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meeting in a laundromat with the Capo Bastone of the Siderno locale, a man named Giuseppe 
Commisso (McKenzie). Italian law enforcement under the direction of Nicola Gratteri had 
arranged a wiretap of the laundromat to listen to Commisso’s conversations about ‘Ndrangheta 
operations and inadvertently caught and later identified Vallelonga as well. The conversation 
between the two men involved a debate over the creation of a new locale in Perth to be 
controlled by Commisso. Vallelonga argued that he and the other Australian bosses would not 
approve such a locale, warning, “As long as I’m alive, you don’t get a locale and that’s that!” 
(McKenzie).  
In 1992, Italy passed a package of anti-mafia legislation that provided for the use of 
undercover operations and wiretaps, and criminalized the buying of votes on the part of elected 
officials (UNODC). This legislation made the material gathered at the Commisso-Vallelonga 
meeting admissible in Italian courts, and successfully demonstrated their ‘Ndrangheta 
association according to the legal standard set forth by Article 416 of the Italian Penal Code. 
This article, first introduced to the code with the 1982 La Torre Law, criminalizes “Participation 
in an organized criminal group” and broadly defines participation as: 
Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of a 
crime involving an organized criminal group. 
Participation in criminal activities of an organized criminal group. 
 
Agreement to commit a serious crime (conspiracy). 
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According to the law, “when three or more persons associate in order to commit several 
criminal offences, those promoting or setting up or organizing such association shall be liable, 
for this sole offence, to imprisonment for 3 to 7 years. For the sole fact of participating in the 
association, the punishment shall be imprisonment for 1 to 5 years. Those directing the 
association shall be liable to the same punishments as those promoting it” (UNODC). 
Vallelonga was accused under Italian criminal law of participation in an organized 
criminal group. In his conversation with Commisso, he demonstrated extensive knowledge of 
and participation in ‘Ndrangheta activity in Calabria and Australia, speaking not only as a 
participant, but one in a position of authority attempting to promote, direct, and organize the 
group (UNODC). Tony Vallelonga was not aware of the investigation until 2011, when it was 
announced that Nicola Gratteri was seeking an extradition to prosecute him in Calabria for 
participation in an organized criminal group. The announcement came as an enormous surprise 
to the entire country, and particularly in the communities around Perth and Sterling (McKenzie). 
The extradition request stalled almost immediately (McKenzie). The reason for the 
ultimate failure of the request can be found in the fine print an international diplomatic 
agreement between Italy and Australia. The two countries established an extradition treaty in 
1985 entitled “Treaty of Extradition Between Australia and the Republic of Italy,” which came 
into force in 1990. In Section 1 of Article 2, “Extraditable Offenses,” the treaty states:  
 
Extraditable offences are offences which, at the time of the request for extradition, are 
punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by imprisonment or other 
deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year or by a more severe penalty. Where 
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the request for extradition relates to a person convicted of such an offence who is wanted 
for the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty, 
extradition shall be granted only if a period of at least six months of such penalty remains 
to be served (Federal Register). 
 
The part of Article 2 Section 1 that requires the offense to be “punishable under the laws 
of both Contracting Parties” is typically referred to as a “dual criminality” clause. This 
requirement is a common component of extradition treaties, as it prohibits extradition in cases 
where the offender broke a law that exists in the country seeking the extradition but does not 
exist in the host country. A dual criminality requirement would, for example, allow the U.S. 
government to lawfully refuse a request by the Chinese government to extradite a Chinese 
individual residing in the United States for breaking a censorship law that does not exist in the 
United States but does exist in China. In this way, Article 2 Section 1 of the Australia-Italy 
extradition treaty effectively prevents the Australian government from extraditing Tony 
Vallelonga, because the Australian penal code does not criminalize participation in an organized 
criminal group as severely or as broadly as its Italian counterpart.   
In Australia, the task of combatting organized crime is complicated by the country’s form 
of federalism. Australia is a federation made up of nine separate jurisdictions, each with their 
own sets of laws, including six states, two territories, and the Commonwealth. This arrangement 
makes it difficult for Australia to create a united front in the criminalization of participation in an 
organized criminal group (Sergi 327). In the Tony Vallelonga case, the relevant state law would 
be the Criminal Organizations Control Act in Western Australia, enacted in 2012. However, this 
legislation does not criminalize the behavior of Tony Vallelonga during his 2009 visit to Calabria 
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because it is written very generally, while its Italian counterpart specifically defines ‘Ndrangheta 
association as a criminal association and provides for jail time. The Western Australian 
legislation only goes so far as to enabling “control orders to be made to disrupt and restrict the 
activities of members and former members of the organization and certain other persons” 
(Federal Register). Western Australian law enforcement can use evidence such as Tony 
Vallelonga’s laundromat conversation to secure a declaration stating that a particular association 
is a criminal association, which then gives the state more scrutiny power in the form of 
infiltration or surveillance, in order to obtain evidence of actual crimes committed by members. 
Whereas in Italy, Tony Vallelonga’s laundromat conversation is sufficient proof of participation 
in the activities of ‘Ndrangheta, an organization specifically identified as being a criminal 
association, earning him a guaranteed prison sentence. 
In a paper titled “Countering the Australian ‘Ndrangheta,” Anna Sergi explains: 
 
Within the more general approach against organized crime as seen across Australian 
jurisdictions, the only way to actually criminalize mafias would be by adding the 
‘ndrangheta to the list of proscribed criminal associations. This, however, is bound to be 
a very unpopular choice: first, because it would carry the risk of criminalizing ethnic 
connotations (the Calabrian element of the ‘ndrangheta) and second, as said, because we 
do not actually know how formal is the organizational structure of the Calabrian clans in 
Australia. The risk would be, once again, to target (ethnic) identities and not (mafia) 
behaviors, which the ‘ndrangheta exhibits also in Australia (329). 
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 Anna Sergi proceeds to discuss the ways in which Australia can thread the needle and 
criminalize criminal behavior and not ethnic identity, and upholds the Italian La Torre Law and 
American Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act as examples for doing so. But the 
situation in Australia is such that its anti-association laws are not really anti-mafia laws, and the 
differences between the Australian and Italian penal codes with regard to criminal associations 
render the possibility of dual criminality and extradition impossible in the case of Tony 
Vallelonga. Moreover, the extradition agreement between Italy and Australia requires that the 
relevant offense be punishable under the laws of both countries “at the time of the request for 
extradition.” Western Australia’s Criminal Organizations Control Act was not enacted until 
2012, while Nicola Gratteri’s request was made in 2011. Essentially, the window for arresting 
and prosecuting Tony Vallelonga closed the moment he returned to Australia from his 2009 trip 
to Calabria. 
 The problem has not only affected the prosecution of ‘Ndrangheta in Australia. In 2012, 
Nicola Gratteri remarked, “it is ten years since we told the Canadians to pay attention because 
‘Ndrangheta is very present in Canada, mostly in Toronto… We did not have good collaboration 
with the Canadian police” (“Italian prosecutors”). Gratteri identified the same problems with the 
Canadian case: Canadian law enforcement is unwilling to aggressively prosecute ‘Ndrangheta 
activities in Canada and will not allow the Italian state to do so in its place through extradition 
because of the country’s lack of a mafia-association law (“Italian prosecutors”). In this way, 
‘Ndrangheta locali in Canada enjoy the same protection as their Australian counterparts. In fact, 
there are currently 30 Canadian citizens identified by Italian law enforcement as participants in 
‘Ndrangheta criminal activities, and nearly a third have outstanding Italian arrest warrants. These 
individuals are effectively shielded by the legal asymmetry between the two countries (“Italian 
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prosecutors”). Meanwhile in Argentina, another prominent ‘Ndrangheta base, Article 210 of the 
country’s penal code “provides the offense of associación illicita, and punishes anyone who 
takes part in an association of three or more persons “dedicated to the commission of crimes” 
(Savona 243). Argentinian courts are able to categorize Italian mafia-type association as an 
association dedicated to the commission of crimes and prosecute ‘Ndrangheta members more 
actively or fulfill the dual criminality requirement for extradition to Italy (Savona 243). As a 
testament to the legal symmetry between the two countries, Argentina granted an Italian request 
for the extradition of Pantaleone Mancuso, a high-ranking member of the Mancuso clan, in 2014 
for his ‘Ndrangheta association. Legal symmetry is a powerful weapon against ‘Ndrangheta, but 
it requires a community-wide agreement on legal principles like mafia association. Without this 
agreement, ‘Ndrangheta will always be able to reconstitute itself in a new corner of the world 




 Franco Roberti served as the Italian National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor and head of the 
National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Directorate from 2013 to 2017. During his time as 
the country’s top anti-mafia prosecutor, Roberti was a vocal critic of the lack of legal integration 
in the international community. In 2016, during a panel hosted by John Cabot University in 
Rome, Roberti identified “irregular legal symmetry between different countries,” “scarce 
international cooperation,” and “differences between judicial systems” as significant barriers to 
the prosecution of transnational organized crime (Roberti). His emphasis on the concept of legal 
symmetry serves as a warning to the international community. Since the 1990s, states have 
demonstrated an aggressive capacity to pursue economic integration, but ignore the implications 
of this integration on the expansion of organized crime. Economic integration and the surging 
commerce that comes with it must be complimented with legal integration, which allows parallel 
legislation to span borders with the same ease demonstrated by criminal organizations. As the 
international community grapples with the global economy, the world’s youngest economy, 
inconsistencies are bound to arise until they are ironed out. However, the gap between economic 
and legal integration is one of the most glaring inconsistencies due to the extent to which it has 
empowered criminal organizations like ‘Ndrangheta.  
 No one ever said growing up was easy, but the global economy is arguably over 25 years 
old. 25 years have passed since the world was first confronted with the challenges of rapid 
globalization. States must recognize that the commerce that benefits them also presents 
opportunities to parasitic actors outside the licit economy. Only when the international 
community begins the aggressive pursuit of anti-mafia legislation criminalizing mafia 
association outside of Italy, combined with commitments to provide the technology, manpower, 
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and information needed to secure international commercial hubs like the Port of Gioia Tauro, 
will it begin to curtail the capacity to of ‘Ndrangheta to produce tens of billions of dollars in 
annual revenue through a legacy of exploitation, extortion, murder, corruption, fraud, 
environmental damage, in addition to the trafficking of human beings, drugs, weapons, and 
contraband.  
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